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A UNION OF FORMALISM AND FLEXIBILITY: ALLOWING
EMPLOYERS TO SET THEIR OWN LIABILITY UNDER
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
INTRODUCTION
Several federal employment discrimination statutes allocate
protection depending on whether potential plaintiffs occupy
positions of control within a business entity. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),2 and the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act
(ERISA) all permit suits by "employees" against their current or
former employers, but do not provide any avenue of relief for those
classified as "employers."4 For instance, the ADEA provides: "It
shall be unlawful for any employer ... to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees ... because of such individual's age...."'
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
3. Id. §§ 1001-1461.
4. For the purposes of this Note, the provisions of Title VII, the ADEA, and ERISA will
be considered together. This is not improper treatment because courts often look to the
manner in which prior cases have interpreted corresponding provisions of these acts for help
in forming their own constructions of "employee" and "employer." See, e.g., Serapion v.
Martinez, 119 F.3d 982,985 (1st Cir. 1997) ("We regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and FLSA
[Fair Labor Standards Act) as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating
judicial precedents interpreting one such statute as instructive in decisions involving
another."); Gavalik v. Contl Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987) (identifying similarity
between ERISA claims and employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII);
Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 969 F. Supp. 207,214 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (referring to
a "cross-construction method" used when construing various acts, including the ADA, ADEA,
and Title VII); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 147 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) ("[CIases construing the definitional provisions of [Title VIII are persuasive authority
when interpreting the [ADEA].") (citation omitted). This process of borrowing established
interpretations of the employment relationship has been referred to as cross-fertilization. See
Daniel S. KGeinberger, "Magnificent Circularity" and the Churkendoose: LLC Members and
Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 477, 502 n.118 (1997).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 623.
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Predictably, courts have not always agreed as to what
differentiates an employee from an employer. Particularly with
regard to innovative business forms that have risen to prominence
in recent decades, the distinction between the two is confounded.6
Statutory language defines an employee as "any individual
employed by an employer."7 A strict statutory construction,
therefore, would categorically deny relief to some members of
business entities organized as partnerships, yet universally afford
protection to similarly situated members of incorporated entities.8
Traditionally, a partner could not stand in an employment
relationship with his or her partnership because partners
personally control the ownership interests, making them employers
rather than employees. Because a partnership is the partners, it
cannot also employ the partners. Stated from another angle, a
partnership simply cannot employ itself. If partners cannot employ
themselves, it follows that partners cannot be employees in the
technical sense of the term. On the contrary, all partners are, by
default, employers. As a result, partners are ineligible to seek
protection from employment discrimination because employers are
not members of a protected category.
Compare partnerships to incorporated entities. Unlike a
partnership, a corporation is an independent legal persona existing
only on paper. It exists wholly apart from even its most high-
ranking officers, operates as the de facto employer, and exists in
perpetuity.' The title of "employer" resides with either the legal
persona or, ultimately, with the shareholders."l Thus, no person
6. See Alan Ross Haguewood, Note, Gray Power in the Gray Area Between Employer and
Employee: the Applicability of the ADEA to Members of Limited Liability Companies, 51
VAND. L. REV. 429 (1998) (discussing courts' differing analyses and results concerning
whether members of a limited liability company (LLC) are employees).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6); see also id. § 630(f) (defining the term "employee" as "an
individual employed by any employer ....").
8. Haguewood, supra note 6, at 449-50.
9. See id. at 438 n.38.
10. Note, however, that the problem presented by corporations employing their own
shareholders has not been addressed. These circumstances present the best argument for
application of the employer exemption to the corporate setting. If, for example, in a closely
held corporation, a shareholder-employee owned enough shares to be influential in the
management of the company, protection from employment discrimination would seem
unnecessary. Decisions involving less influential shareholder-employees, however, have
favored their status as eligible plaintiffs. See, e.g., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs.,
1454 [Vol. 44:1453
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who works for the corporation will be subject to the employer
exemption, and courts will not dismiss plaintiffs' suits for lack of
statutory standing. 1 Only the corporate persona itself falls into the
employer exemption. 12 A strict statutory construction, therefore,
only affords protection to members of incorporated entities.
Several courts have utilized this all-or-nothing approach and
declined to look past a business entity's organizational form in
determining worker eligibility to sue under Title VII, the ADEA, or
ERISA. 13 This approach has been dubbed the "per se rule." 4 As one
would predict, courts invoking the per se rule always exempt
partners of firms from protection. This is referred to as the
"partnership exemption." 5 A brief history of holdings implicating
794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "where the individual involved is a corporate
employee ... every such employee is 'covered' for the purposes of the ADEA"); Johnson v.
Cooper, Deans & Cargill, P.A., 884 F. Supp. 43,45 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that the firm had
"elected to organize in the corporate form and cannot now avoid the reach of Title VII by
calling its shareholder-employees partners"); cf EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177,
1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding "no reason to treat the shareholders of a professional
corporation differently for purposes of Title VII actions than [it) did partners of [an]
accounting firm ... ).
11. Plaintiffs can, however, fall out of the protected category in the opposite direction.
Lively debate persists concerning who is an employee and who is an independent contractor.
The latter would be ineligible to seek protection under the acts because independent
contractors are neither employers nor employees. This Note, however, is concerned only with
the opposite end of the employment spectrum (i.e., who is sufficiently empowered to justify
the label of employer and thus ineligible to seek relief offered only to employees).
Nevertheless, the doctrine that has developed around this question very closely parallels the
central focus of this Note. For additional commentary on this topic, see generally Edward T.
Ellis & Jessica Y. Chong, Defining the Term 'Employee" Under Federal Statutes Relating to
Employment, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1063 (ALI-ABA SGO16, 2001)
(commenting on the application of the common law, economic reality, and hybrid tests to
determine temporary employee status under selected federal statutes); Daniel M. Feinberg,
Contingent Workers & Misclassified Employees, in 30THANNUALINSTrrUTE ON EMPLOYMENT
LAW, at 383 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 664, 2001)
(reviewing various factors used by courts to determine independent contractor status); Phillip
R. Maltin, By Any Other Name, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2001, at 53.
12. Note that corporate personas are nothing more than legal fictions, which, in contrast
to flesh and blood partners, cannot be victims of workplace discrimination in the first place.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See Troy D. Ferguson, Partners as Employees Under the Federal Employment
Discrimination Statutes: Are the Roles of Partner and Employee Mutually Exclusive?, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 699, 710-11 (1988); Haguewood, supra note 6, at 438-44.
15. See Haguewood, supra note 6, at 437-44.
The term "exemption" is somewhat misleading, however. It implies coverage
exists, from which a dispensation is provided. Instead, the question in most
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the per se rule and justifications for its use is offered in Part I of
this Note.
More recent decisions reflect an emerging trend, which is to
consider a plaintiff's ability to protect his or her own interests
within a business entity in order to determine eligibility for
protection under ERISA, the ADEA, or Title VII. Courts have
focused on an extensive, though not exhaustive, list of factors 16 that
tend to indicate "whether the employer's control of employment
opportunities places the worker in a position of dependency on
the employer which may expose the worker to discriminatory
conduct." 7 Courts that use this test ask whether a position of
dependency within a business entity negates the presumption
that a partner cannot be a victim of employment discrimination.
This in-depth inquiry, spurning deference to an individual's title
and focusing instead on actual powers, is referred to as the
"economic realities test."' Part II of this Note will briefly examine
representative cases that used the economic realities test as well as
examine the justifications for its use.
The per se rule has received scant approval in recent years. The
economic realities test has emerged as the more pragmatic, if
less practicable, alternative of the two, though it is still unclear
why these tests are necessary at all. Perhaps when the federal
employment discrimination statutes were crafted, the distinction
between employers and employees was more apparent. With the
onset of various new business forms in recent decades,' however,
this distinction has blurred. Professional corporations, limited
cases is whether the basic commands of the statute apply in the first place.
When courts say they recognize a "partnership exemption" to employment
discrimination statutes, they simply mean that the statutes do not apply to
partners. In other words, they are construing the statutory term "employee" so
as not to include partners.
Id. at 437 n.30.
16. See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436,441 (6th Cir. 1996) (indicating the
Court's list of factors is not exhaustive by allowing for "other indicia of partnership status"
in addition to the stated factors).
17. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 113 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Simpson, 100 F.3d at 442; EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th
Cir. 1984); Dowd, supra note 17, at 102; Ferguson, supra note 14, at 722; Haguewood, supra
note 6, at 444.
19. See Haguewood, supra note 6, at 431.
1456 [Vol. 44:1453
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liability companies, and limited liability partnerships, to name a
few, are business forms that combine various aspects of partner-
ships and corporations.2" In the modern global marketplace,
applying the partnership exemption to individuals holding the office
of partner, though they are deprived of powers traditionally
associated with the title "partner," lacks justification and does more
to undermine the goals of antidiscrimination statutes than it does
to promote them.
The partnership exemption has its roots in partnership law.
Partners are jointly and severally liable for partnership debts, and
the actions of one can often be imputed to the others.21 Because
extensive liability can be easily incurred, courts have traditionally
respected a partnership's freedom of association. For example,
partners possess a nearly unfettered ability to dismiss their
peers, whereas other business entities' dismissals are subject to
greater levels of scrutiny regarding legality and fairness.22 History
has shown, and this Note will reiterate, that this extreme
position invites abuse and runs contrary to congressional intent in
formulating employment discrimination legislation.
There are insufficient justifications for granting workplace
discrimination a judicial safe harbor in partnerships and similar
business forms. If there are legitimate reasons to terminate a
20. "[Wlhen courts say that they are extending the partnership exemption to other
principals, such as professional corporation shareholders or corporate directors, they simply
mean that the same logic preventing partners from being "employees" applies to these
principals." Id. at 437 n.30.
21. See UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 15(a) (1914) (making partners jointly and severally liable for
partnership debts). The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in every state except
Louisiana. See Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 219 n.12 (1994) (providing citations
for each state's adopted Uniform Partnership Act provisions); Howard McCoach, Note,
Applying Title VII to Partners: One Step Beyond, 20 RUTGEPRS L.J. 741, 752 (1989).
22. Though the recent trend has been more activist, the judiciary has traditionally been
reluctant to intervene in partnership decisions, which were seen as the partners' domain.
See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,77-78 n.10 (1984) (analogizing partnership
decisions to "choosing a wife" and citing 110 CONG. REC. 13085 (1964) and 118 CONG. REc.
1524, 2391 (1972)); Stacey B. Chervin, Employment Discrimination: Breaking Through the
Partnership Barrier in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203,210-
11 (1994) ("Another anology which has been used to explain the reluctance of the judiciary
to interfere in partnership decisions is that of a private club."). Chervin argues that "[bly
dictating (partnership appointment decisions], the court is clearly in danger of intruding
upon academic or entrepreneurial freedom." Id. at 210.
20031 1457
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partner, severance can be achieved without violating federal law.
Otherwise, the reasons underlying the termination are inherently
suspect and should be scrutinized. It is now neither appropriate to
assume that partners possess the power to protect themselves from
discrimination nor judicious to ignore their pleas.
Turning a blind eye to legitimate discrimination claims is
imprudent; completely disregarding the sound reasons underlying
the genesis of the partnership exemption is equally unwise. This
Note takes the position that a solution capitalizing on the strengths
of both approaches exists because concepts of workplace equality
and a partnership's right to choose its members are not mutually
exclusive. Allowing a business to determine for itself which of its
employees are eligible for federal employment discrimination pro-
tection, subject to a threshold finding of fairness, would effectuate
congressional intent in crafting employment discrimination legis-
lation as well as respect a business entity's independence and
freedom of choice.
Much like a corporation with thousands of dispersed share-
holders, worldwide "partnerships" often have so many partners that
it is unreasonable to expect that they will all participate fully in
management decisions. Because such partners are necessarily
removed from positions of actual power within a business entity,
the assumption that they are beyond the reach of employment
discrimination no longer holds water.2' Extending protection to
corporate employees when a lack of dependency makes protection
from employment discrimination unnecessary is also unsound.
Congress must modify discrimination statutes to redefine the class
of individuals protected by statutes such as the ADEA, Title VII,
and ERISA in order to properly effectuate their original intent.24
Part III of this Note proposes a new standard wherein an
employer, following a prima facie showing that an employee has
sufficient power within the entity with which to protect his own
interests, can classify that individual as exempt from employment
23. See Simpson, 100 F.3d at 445-46 (Daughtrey, J., concurring) (urging Congress "to
recognize ... that the realities of today's global marketplace no longer justify distinguishing
between 'employees' and 'partners' in all instances"); Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F. Supp.
1102 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
24. See Simpson, 100 F.3d at 445-46 (Daughtrey, J., concurring).
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discrimination legislation. The prima facie showing will be made
based upon the existence of a limited set of factors tending to
show a lack of dependence on the employer and thus, limited
vulnerability to employment discrimination.
Non-exempt individuals would be presumptively entitled to the
full protections of federal law. Exempted employees (i.e., those
holding positions classified by their employers as "exempt") would
carry the burden of proof that they are in fact entitled to protection.
The same shortened list of factors used in the prima facie showing
to justify exemption will be used by the plaintiffs claiming
protection to simplify the court's analysis of actual status. More
efficient and more consistent holdings should result if exempted
employees file suit to show that they should be entitled to
protection despite the fact that their employer has classified them
as exempt.
I. THE PER SE RULE
A. History
In 1977, the Seventh Circuit laid the groundwork for the per se
rule in Burke v. Friedman25 when it declined to "expand the
definition of employee to include a partner."26 Other circuits soon
followed suit. In Hishon v. King & Spalding," the plaintiff brought
suit against her law firm claiming discrimination on the basis of her
gender following the firm's refusal to make her a partner. The
Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII protections did not extend to
partnership decisions 2 and affirmed the district court's dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Although the Supreme
Court reversed on the grounds that the plaintiff had stated a claim
cognizable under Title VII, ° the Court declined to expressly reject
25. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
26. Id. at 870.
27. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
28. Id. at 1028 ("[W]e are unwilling to dictate partnership decisions under the guise of
employee promotions protected by Title VII.").
29. Id. at 1030.
30. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1984).
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the per se rule."1 Furthermore, in a concurring opinion often
cited in support of the per se rule, Justice Powell stated that "the
relationship among law partners differs markedly from that
between employer and employee [because] [the essence of the law
partnership is the common conduct of a shared enterprise."32 This
statement has been interpreted to mean that partners and
employees are mutually exclusive categories.33
In Wheeler v. Main Hurdman,"' the Tenth Circuit declined to
scrutinize the relationship between the plaintiff and her firm,
despite the fact that her termination came a mere seventeen
months after her promotion to partner.8 Wheeler claimed that her
support staff, supervisors, clients, and duties all remained the
same following promotion, and that she was no more at liberty to
establish her own fees than before her elevation to partnership
status.36 Furthermore, she claimed that the organizational struc-
ture of the firm more closely resembled a corporation than a
partnership because the firm was controlled primarily by a
managing partner and a policy board. 7
Essentially, Wheeler argued that because her employer was a
nationwide entity governed by a board on which she was not
represented, she was too far removed from the nexus of control to
justify the assumption that she could protect her own interests
within the firm. The Tenth Circuit cited Hishon for support 8 and
denied Wheeler's requests for a more precise inquiry. Instead, the
court held that to not follow Hishon would "ignore or unacceptably
31. Id. at 77-78.
32. Id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Chervin, supra note 22, at 212 ("Some appellate courts have since used Justice
Powell's concurrence to preclude former partners, who claim that they were terminated on
a discriminatory basis, from prevailing in Title VII suits.*); Larry E. Ribstein, Law Partner
Expulsion, 55 Bus. LAW. 845, 879 (2000) ("(A] concurring opinion by Justice Powell (] noted
that the employment discrimination laws probably do not regulate a partnership's
employment decisions involving partners.").
34. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 258.
36. Id. at 261.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 263-65, 276.
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diminish the essential attributes of partnership, [and such a test
would be] incapable of rational application."3 9
In the corporate setting, however, plaintiffs are regularly deemed
to fall within the scope of federal employment discrimination laws
despite possessing powers and duties analogous to those tra-
ditionally associated with partnership status. In Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Associates, P. C.,40 a suit brought under the ADEA,
the Second Circuit faced circumstances similar to those in Hishon.
Despite the fact that the professional corporation in Hyland
functioned more like a partnership than a corporation, the plaintiff
was deemed an employee by the court because "[t]he fact that
certain modern partnerships and corporations are practically
indistinguishable in structure and operation ... is no reason for
ignoring a form of business organization freely chosen and
established."4' In other words, choice of corporate form forecloses
the application of the partnership exemption in the Second Circuit.
Several district court holdings have also embraced the per se
rule. In Holland v. Ernst & Whinney,'2 the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held that the "ADEA applies only to
discrimination in the context of employment and has no application
in the context of this case."' In so holding, the court implied that
the defendant's choice of business form (partnership), considered in
tandem with the plaintiffs title (partner), created a relationship
that could not be correctly characterized as one of employment
within the meaning of the ADEA." The suit was dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.45
In Maher v. Price Waterhouse," the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri held that partners of an accounting firm could
not qualify as employees within the meaning of the ADEA. Notably,
however, the court recognized a narrow exception to the per se rule
and imposed a requirement that the partner's position in the firm
39. Id. at 276.
40. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
41. Id. at 798.
42. 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 1984).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. No. 84-1522 C (2), 1985 WL 9500 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985).
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be genuine.4'7 The court implied that employees granted partner-
ship status in name only and not in substance would be considered
employees for the purposes of the ADEA.' s Particularly, the court
had in mind firms seeking only to sidestep federal antidiscrim-
ination laws by labeling their employees "partners" while leaving
unchanged the actual features of the employment relationship.
Though the court stopped short of urging an economic realities
analysis, the holding nevertheless recognized the increasing appeal
of an economic realities test.
Though the popularity of the per se rule has been fading in recent
years, it is still operative. The most recent Ninth Circuit decision on
the issue rejected the notion that corporate employees could ever be
beyond the reach of employment discrimination laws. By negative
implication, the court had to presume that partners could be
exempt from such laws. In Wells v. Clackamas Gastroenterology
Associates, P.C., 9 the court stated that:
[W]e find Hyland's reasoning to be considerably more persuasive
.... Because ... there is no reason to permit a professional
corporation to secure the "best of both possible worlds" by
allowing it both to assert its corporate status in order to reap the
tax and civil liability advantages and to argue that it is like a
partnership in order to avoid liability for unlawful employment
discrimination.6°
The court approved the use of the economic realities test to
determine whether a partner's label (in a partnership) is accurate.
The court, however, disapproved of the economic realities test,
opting instead for the per se rule, whenever corporate form is
involved."' In other words, the court adopted the "labels are destiny"
47. Id.; see also Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (warning employers
that deliberate attempts to evade the scope of employment discrimination laws through
misleading labels would forfeit the protection afforded by the employee-employer distinction
embedded in such laws).
48. See Maher, No. 84-1522C(2), 1985 WL at *2.
49. 271 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. Id. at 905.
51. The court explained:
It is one thing to apply an "economic realities" test to determine that a nominal
partner should, under appropriate circumstances, be considered an "employee"
[Vol. 44:14531462
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approach, 2 where choice of organizational form is determinative,
although only where noncorporate forms are involved.
B. Support for the Per Se Rule
There are several arguments in favor of the continued application
of the per se rule to partnerships. At the very least, it offers
predictability. Both potential plaintiffs and employers alike have an
interest in knowing the extent to which they are protected by
federal employment discrimination laws and exposed to statutory
liability, respectively. A bright line rule conserves judicial resources
that would inevitably be lost in a more in-depth review of the
circumstances giving rise to the litigation.
Furthermore, contractual freedom is sure to produce an infinite
number of gradations with regard to the interests and control
that a particular business associate may have within any type of
entity."3 Because an analysis of the economic realities test factors
in order to determine eligibility for protection under the statutes
would yield no bright line rule and, most likely, yield inconsistent
decisions, it would offer predictability to non-litigants likely to be
affected by such decisions.
Business entities may value very highly the right to expel
business associates for any reason. This might not only factor
prominently into an entity's choice of business form, but the choice
of business form would then in turn provide notice of who has
standing to sue under employment discrimination laws. "ITihere is
something to be said for allowing a limited type of opt-out through
partnership law from the otherwise mandatory employment
discrimination laws."5 '
Finally, diminishing the scope of the "employer" exemption from
antidiscrimination statutes by broadly construing the term
"employee" may adversely affect a business entity's power to
in order to prevent a firm from labeling the bulk of its employees as partners
simply to insulate itself from liability for discrimination. It is quite another
thing, however, to apply the "economic realities" test in order to classify
shareholder-employees of a corporate enterprise as partners.
Id. (citation omitted).
52. Kleinberger, supra note 4, at 546.
53. Id.
54. Ribstein, supra note 33, at 880.
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regulate its own members and undermine the logic behind the
partnership exemption. "[Adding] a layer of scrutiny to expulsion
decisions .... could reduce firms' ability to discipline partners and
maintain their reputations."5 Not only would the broad con-
struction create intra-firm regulatory and control problems, but, at
least theoretically, the additional protections provided by federal
employment discrimination law might be unnecessary because
market forces should provide an adequate safeguard against
unfair dealing.5" In other words, a business with a reputation for
improperly discriminating against its own members will surely face
the ensuing recruiting, retention, and employee loyalty problems
created by its own conduct.57
The per se rule reflects a hands-off approach to employment
regulation. It is assumed that the business, having chosen its own
form, cannot then be held to the standards of the form not chosen.
It is further assumed that the per se rule will not cripple a business'
efforts to regulate internally, and market forces will operate to
protect employees from discrimination. Additionally, the per se rule
fosters consistency and predictability. Although these factors all
weigh strongly in favor of the per se rule, the rule's success has
been compromised by its rigidity.
II. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST
The economic realities test has not been uniformly applied by all
courts that employ it. Historically, courts have freely engineered
various hybrid 'versions of the economic realities test in their
55. Id. at 879; see also Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 947, 947-49 (1984) (arguing that legal action is an insufficient substitute for freedom
of association).
56. Ribstein, supra note 33, at 879-80.
57. Following an administrative tribunal's finding that the law firm of Baker &
McKenzie's discharge of an associate with AIDS was motivated by discrimination, the firm
was banned from recruiting on New York University Law School's campus. See Edward A.
Adams, NYUBansBaker& McKenzie's New York Office From Recruiting, 213 N.Y. L.J., Mar.
14, 1995, at 1. Another act of discrimination by the same firm in the late eighties earned
similar recruiting bans from Georgetown, Chicago, and Berkeley law schools as well as a
year probationary status with Harvard. Id. Some students decide not to consider employment
with fins that have a discriminatory reputation. See, e.g., Barbara Steuart, Concerned
Students May Still Give Baker & McKenzie a Try, THE RECORDER, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1.
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holdings. In Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, P.C.,5 8
for example, the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania applied a hybrid test that "looks at the economic
realities of the situation but focuses on the employer's right to
control the employee as the most important factor in determining
employee status."59 In holding that a shareholder-employee of a
professional corporation had standing to sue under the ADEA, the
court combined elements of the straightforward economic realities
test and the common law agency test.60
The District Court for the Western District of New York applied
a more straightforward economic realities test in Caruso v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 6 ' The court looked to the plaintiffs actual
duties and status within the firm and held that, although a bona
fide partner could not qualify as an employee under the ADEA, a
partner whose position within the firm more closely resembled that
of a typical salaried worker with a fancy job title did fall within the
ADEA's employer exemption. 2 Judge Walker, writing for the
majority, explained that an employee's particular classification
could not be dispositive because such an approach would grant
employers free reign "to strip employees of their ADEA rights
simply by denoting all employees as 'partners,' without giving these
employees any actual decision-making authority or job security."63
He recognized that an inherent fault in any bright line rule is its
inflexibility, resulting in a susceptibility to technical limitations.
Recent decisions invoking the economic realities test are Hull v.
Rose, Schmidt, Hasley & DiSalle P.C.64 and Simpson v. Ernst &
Young.65 Though the court in Hull held that a partner was ineligible
to seek relief under a state antidiscrimination statute due to an
employer exemption analogous to the one found in the ADEA, it
58. 670 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
59. Id. at 601 (quoting EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983)).
60. Id. at 601-02 (using a hybrid approach, and holding, "we find lJones] meets the hybrid
standard for an employee under the ADEA").
61. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
62. Id. For more discussion on this case, see Charles S. Caulkins & James J. McDonald,
Jr., Lawyer Terminations: Increasingly the Subject of Employment Discrimination Suits, 65
FLA. B.J., Feb. 1991, at 27, 28-29.
63. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 148.
64. 700 A.2d 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
65. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248 (1997).
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only did so following an inquiry "[c]onsidering the approved usage
and plain meaning of the word 'partner' in the context of the facts
averred ... increased earnings, ownership status, and exposure to
liability and change in management control ... qualities that are
commonly associated and used in conjunction with the term
'employer.'6 Other courts have similarly applied the economic
realities test and yet held that the plaintiff was beyond the reach of
federal employment discrimination legislation. 7
The Sixth Circuit in Simpson held that an Ernst & Young
partner should be considered an employee for the purpose of the
ADEA and ERISA.' The court identified and applied the following
factors for determining eligibility of partners to sue as employees
under the acts:
the right and duty to participate in management; the right and
duty to act as an agent of other partners; exposure to liability;
the fiduciary relationship among partners; use of the term "co-
owners" to indicate each partner's "power of ultimate control;"
participation in profits and losses; investment in the firm;
partial ownership of firm assets; voting rights; the aggrieved
individual's ability to control and operate the business; the
extent to which the aggrieved individual's compensation was
calculated as a percentage of the firm's profits; the extent of that
individual's employment security; and other similar indicia of
ownership.69
The factors identified by the court were derived from the common
law principles of employment codified in the Uniform Partnership
66. Hull, 700 A.2d at 1000.
67. See, e.g., Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991) (focusing
on the traditional role of partners, the role of partners relative to concepts of control and
ownership, and plaintiffs' conformity therewith); Rhoads v. Jones Fin. Cos., 957 F. Supp.
1102, 1110 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (MThe evidence before the Court shows that at the time of
plaintiffs alleged discriminatory discharge, plaintiff was a bona fide partner and not an
employee ofthe partnership."); see also Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job
Creation Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181,208 n.119
(1999) ("Where there is strong evidence of partner ownership of the business and partner
participation in firm governance, and where partner compensation is based on a percentage
of the fiu-m's profits, a partner is deemed to have a 'proprietary' interest in the business that
precludes her treatment as an 'employee.').
68. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996).
69. Id.
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Act.70 An analysis of the stated factors led to the court's holding
that Simpson was, in reality, an employee rather than a bona fide
partner.
71
Simpson had no authority to direct or participate in the
admission or discharge of partners or other firm personnel;
participate in determining partners or other personnel com-
pensation predicated upon performance levels, responsibility,
and years of service with the firm, including his own; participate
in the vote for the chairman or the members of the Management
Committee; or participate in the firm's profits and losses or
share in unbilled uncollected client accounts ("UBT's"). Simpson
had no right to examine the books and records of the firm except
to the extent permitted by the Management Committee. He was
required to execute a will which mandated that his heirs accept
as binding the accounts provided by Ernst & Young with no
right of inspection or verification. He had no authority to sign
promissory notes on behalf of the firm, or pledge, transfer, or
otherwise assign his interest in the firm. He was refused access
to data concerning various client accounts. He was denied
participation in annual performance reviews and other indicia
of partnership status. 2
The trial court had held that "[for all practical purposes, [Simpson]
was an employee with the additional detriment of having promised
to be liable for the firm's losses."7' The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision.
The strongest justification for the economic realities test can be
found in the remedial nature of the federal employment dis-
crimination statutes themselves. The purposes of the statutes are
to protect those vulnerable to employment discrimination and
shield them from workplace inequities, which warrant a liberal
construction of statutory language defining employees subject to
protection. As Professor Ferguson writes:
70. Id. at 443.
71. Id. at 442.
72. Id. at 441.
73. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 665 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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One can make a strong argument ... that the expansive
interpretation of the term "employee" under the economic
realities test comports with Congress' intent in enacting Title
VII [and] the ADEA .... Congress easily could have included a
more restrictive definition, but it did not do so because such a
definition would have impaired the broad purpose of the
statutes.74
Though courts had already begun used the economic realities test
to determine employee status, Congress declined to amend the
statutory definition included in the ADEA, Title VII, or ERISA. This
inferred tacit approval of the economic realities test would have
remained conjectural had Congress not actively amended other
statutes where judicial use of an economic realities test was
disfavored.75 Congress' inaction in the context of the ADEA, Title
VII, and ERISA has evidenced approval of the economic realities
test and ratified a broad construction of the term "employee."
Despite the "freedom of association" logic underlying the part-
nership exemption, the broad purpose of the statutes may be
frustrated if the characteristics of the modern partner no longer
justify the presumption of sufficient power and control in a business
entity to protect the partner's own interests.76
As noted by Judge Daughtrey in her concurring opinion in
Simpson:
74. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 724; see also Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139
(6th Cir. 1977); Dowd, supra note 17, at 89-95.
75. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-52 (2000) (codifying amendments to the National Labor Relation
Act of 1935, specifically implementing a more narrow definition of"employee" by requiring
courts to construe the term "employee" by using the common law right-to-control test);
Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir. 1983) ("In that Congress was specifically
aware of the judicial construction accorded the term 'employee' absent an explicit limitation,
we now refuse to imply such a restriction into the otherwise broad terms of Title VII.")
(footnote omitted).
76. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is currently investigating
the forced demotion or discharge of several older partners in the law firm of Sidley, Austin,
Brown & Wood. The EEOC claims that Sidley is run by a small management committee
(eight members) and executive committee (thirty-six members), which make all the
important decisions in the firm. Only about ten percent of the partners sit on either
committee, and other partners do not have the right to elect their representatives. See David
Koeppel, When Is a Partner Not Really a Partner?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at 12.
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In an era of small, closely-operated partnerships, it may have
been logical to conclude that an employer/partner could not and
would not discriminate in employment decisions against himself
or herself or against a close friend and business associate. In a
world-wide organization like Ernst & Young that employs
almost 2200 "partners," however, the nominal co-owners of the
company are, by necessity, so far removed from the seat of
actual power as to be subject to the reach of the invidious acts
that employment discrimination statutes seek to remedy.77
The purposes of employment discrimination legislation could be
further circumscribed if companies were allowed to place their
employees beyond the reach of the statutes merely by giving them
fancy job titles while leaving their rights, duties, and workload
unchanged.7" Once again, where the distinction between partners
and employees is rendered meaningless, blind adherence to form
over substance is unwarranted.
Professor Ferguson offers several additional arguments in favor
of the economic realities test. First, he argues that a broad
construction of the term "employee" will reduce dependence on
government assistance.79 Society, therefore, will benefit when
individuals are not disadvantaged by artificial barriers to equal
employment.8" Second, he argues that Congress purposefully
declined to offer a more specific definition of a "employee" because
the broad purpose of the statute would be better served by a less
restrictive definition.8 1
A partner who lacks the traditional powers associated with his
position does not receive the benefits that courts presume when
they deny him protection from workplace discrimination. Because
he presumptively possesses these powers, the fact that he is beyond
the reach of the statutes does not seem to be problematic. This
double-edged sword presents a problem when partners-in-name,
employees-in-substance, "are twice deprived merely because of
the partnership label; i.e., they do not receive the full benefits
77. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 445 (Daughtrey, J., concurring); see also Caulkins & McDonald,
supra note 62, at 27.
78. See Ferguson, supra note 14, at 729 n.186.
79. Id. at 723.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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of partnership, nor are they afforded the protection given to
employees."82
Finally, it is clear that the partnership ranks of worldwide
organizations are so large and consequently elevations to part-
nership status so commonplace that the partnership agreement is
necessarily a predrafted document. The firm cannot bargain with
each associate and produce a unique partnership agreement for
each of them. This would create an unmanageable situation in
which firm members holding equivalent offices could possess an
infinite number of employment relationships with the firm. An
associate who has worked with the firm for several years in order
to earn an invitation to join the partnership will be reluctant to
turn down the partnership agreement and look elsewhere, despite
the imposed terms. The associate, devoid of bargaining power, will
almost inevitably sign the agreement rather than start over
somewhere else.8"
The fact that this has become accepted practice is not objec-
tionable per se. The fact that associates now sign partnership
agreements resembling contracts of adhesion, however, allows a
firm to grant powers to the rising partner at its discretion.8 4 If the
powers granted are inferior to the powers typically associated with
partnership, it is inequitable and runs contrary to the purposes of
employment discrimination legislation to leave the partner twice
deprived.
In conclusion, the purposes of employment discrimination
legislation cannot be served by a narrow construction of stat-
utory language. A narrow construction does not provide adequate
82. Id. at 730-31.
83. Id. at 726; James B. Porter, Modern Partnership Interests as Securities: the Effect of
RUPA, RULPA, and LLP Statutes on Investment Contract Analysis, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
955, 975 (1998).
One might think it unlikely that a prospective general partner would sign a
partnership agreement providing almost no power with which to protect his
partnership interest. In some very large partnerships in which prospective
partners have weak bargaining positions, they must agree, however, to have
limited power if they want to become a partner.
Id.
84. "Ernst & Young was free to draft its Partnership Agreement and U.S. Agreement in
such a way as to generate the belief in its employees that they enjoyed partnership status
and to permit them to represent themselves as partners." Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F.
Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
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safeguards against circumvention of the statutes and denies
protection to a class of individuals who are nevertheless subject to
discriminatory conduct. The changing nature of modern business
entities has stripped employees of bargaining power with which to
negotiate their own partnership agreements and granted firms
license to create nontraditional partners who more closely resemble
employees that are unprotected by federal laws. Partners-in-name
but employees-in-substance are twice deprived because they lack
the power to protect their own interests and, under the per se rule,
lack the power to seek protection from the federal government.
Because this outcome is clearly at odds with the goals of the
statutes, it necessitates the broad construction of the term
"employee" which can better be accomplished through judicial use
of some variation of the economic realities test.
III. STATUTORY REMODELING
The widespread rejection of the per se rule reflects the con-
clusion that, although a bright line rule can offer consistency and
predictability, no rigid standard can prevent those wishing to
escape the reach of employment discrimination legislation from
doing so by way of technical limitations. The economic realities
test prevents employers from falsely characterizing those who are
employees in practice as partners and thus effectuates con-
gressional intent. The strongest criticism of the economic realities
test, however, is that it necessitates an extensive inquiry involving
numerous factors, resulting in a time-consuming investigation that
wastes judicial resources and produces inconsistent results. The
goal of any new standard clearly must be the universal application
of a simplified test that maintains flexibility.85
In order to maintain flexibility, some version of the economic
realities test must prevail. To simplify the test, the most relevant
factors must be identified and judicial inquiries shortened to
include only those factors that are truly probative of the issue in
85. See William D. Frumkin et al., Benefits Litigation: Spotting ERISA Issues in General
Employment Disputes and the Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 29 ANN. INST. ON
EMP. L. 881, 910 (2000) ("The application of these different tests has resulted in rulings on
worker classifications that lack conformity or a particular blueprint to guide employers and
employees alike.").
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question. Finally, to foster universal application, the test must be
convincing; it must produce consistent holdings and perform well
within different business settings.
This Note suggests that allowing an employer to determine for
itself which of its employees is eligible for protection will create a
more workable standard. Under the proposed system, an employer
could exempt individuals holding predetermined offices from
protection, subject to a threshold showing of status (i.e., somewhat
analogous to a "partner" under the economic realities test).
Sufficient status to qualify an individual for exemption at the
discretion of his employer would be determined by a simplified
version of the economic realities test, except the proposed test
would seek to show that an individual is exemptible rather than a
partner; nonexempt rather than an employee.
This Note will propose a shortened list of factors to simplify the
economic realities test and give reasons why they are more
determinative of status than other factors currently in use. A look
at how the suggested test should fare in practice will follow, by way
of an application to a hypothetical suit within a limited liability
company. The new test should allow employers to predict which of
its employees can legally be exempted from federal employment
discrimination protections.
A. The Factors
In order to succeed, the exemption test must identify those
factors deemed most determinative of actual status. The results of
the shortened inquiry would be used both by employers to identify
individuals subject to exemption, and by courts in suits brought
challenging.an employer's choice to exempt the holder of a certain
office.
Under the exemption test, the individual's right to challenge
employer decisions concerning exemptions must be exercised before
the partnership agreement or comparable pact between contracting
parties is executed. Post hoc determinations of employee status will
necessarily entail some degree of unpredictability, and allowing ex
ante exemption challenges seems to be the best way to harmonize
an employer's need for predictability and desire to set its own
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liability with the employee's similar need for predictability and
right to remain free from imposed contract terms.
The employee, by executing the employment agreement, implies
acceptance of the exemption status of the new office. Post hoc
challenges should not be banned altogether, but such challenges
must overcome a presumption of fairness in favor of the employer.
The following factors will be discussed in turn: the right and duty
to participate in management, exposure to liability and sharing in
-firm losses, fiduciary relationship among partners, investment in
the firm and ownership of firm assets, the right and duty to act as
the agent of other partners, use of the term "co-owners," extent of
an individuals employment security, and voting rights. These
factors have been identified in many cases because they are drawn
from the "common-law principles as codified in the [Uniform
Partnership Act] .... . Following discussion of the factors listed
above, this Note will suggest two more: the ability to determine the
salaries of others and the ability to make decisions outside of an
individual's immediate scope of influence.
1. The Right and Duty to Participate in Management
Courts' current application of the factor of the right and duty to
participate in management is too vague. It fails to identify exactly
what constitutes management. Is any type of management suf-
ficient? Controlling lower level employees is indicative of both
managerial right and duty, but it does not necessarily establish a
sufficient state of independence from which one could draw the
conclusion that the individual cannot be a victim of employment
discrimination. Perhaps higher-level managerial decisions involving
firm-wide decisions would be more indicative of independency. The
application of this factor should be renamed so a court need only
examine one or two species of higher-order managerial duties
rather than the whole gamut of possible managerial functions.
Courts assessing an individual's ability to control and operate
the business will likely encounter the vagueness problem. Floor
86. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-444 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1248(1997) (citing Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., PA., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01(1lth
Cir. 1991), Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 276 (10th Cir. 1987), and Caruso v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
2003] 1473
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
managers often have an ability to control and operate the day-to-
day business of the firm, but this establishes neither partnership
status nor independence. In a more general sense, an individual's
power to control the firm (or, at the very least resist domination by
it) is the criterium the economic realities test uses to determine
eligibility for certain protections.87 If an individual's power to
control was easy to quantify, however, these other factors would not
bd needed. Saying that a court should consider an individual's right
to control and operate the business, therefore, merely restates the
obvious that the court should employ the economic realities test.
Such an analysis gives no guidance, however, as to the substance of
making such a determination.
2. Exposure to Liability and Sharing in Firm Losses
Exposure to liability and sharing in firm losses are factors that
courts should disregard altogether because they serve no purpose
in determining whether a business associate is a bona fide partner
in a firm. Employers seeking to reduce liability under discrimi-
nation laws by mislabeling employees as partners have only an
increased incentive to make those employees jointly liable for
business debts as well. For example, in Simpson, "'[flor all practical
purposes, [Simpson] was an employee with the additional detriment
of having promised to be liable for the firm's losses.'" Despite the
discussion concerning liability, the court's statement implicitly
rejects liability for business debts as a good indicator of actual
status; the court recognized that an employee can be liable for
losses but still be no closer to real partnership. 9
As in Simpson, liability can be imposed by a partnership
agreement that grants none of the additional rights traditionally
associated with partnership status. A factor such as individual
liability clearly makes the subject look like a partner, but a superior
indicator of actual status would be the traditional benefits
associated with partnership, not the disadvantages. Employers
have nothing to lose and everything to gain from imposing the
87. See Dowd, supra note 17, at 102.
88. Simpson, 100 F.3d 442 (quoting Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 665
(S.D. Ohio 1994)).
89. See id.
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drawbacks of partnership status on associates while withholding
the benefits.
The modern partnership agreement imposes terms that are not
necessarily bargained for." Assuming the firm grants powers to the
rising partner at the firm's discretion, leaving the partner twice
deprived is inequitable and runs contrary to the purpose of
employment discrimination legislation.91 Any test assessing the
fairness of withholding federal protections not should take into
account the control a firm exercises over the individual, but rather
the power that the individual wields over the firm.
3. Fiduciary Relationship Among Partners
The fiduciary relationship existing within the partnership should
also be afforded less weight than it currently is because fiduciary
duties vary based on the nature of the business entity rather than
the power of the individuals operating within it. Although fiduciary
duties between the parties are substantially indicative of the
employment relationship 2 and are not subject to easy manip-
ulation, they also may be impossible to measure. Economic realities
analysis accepts the premise that proper classification should
reflect the rights and duties of an employee rather than assume
they exist by virtue of the classification. History dictates neither the
present nor the future; relationships can evolve or regress over
time. A proper inquiry should center on the state of affairs at the
time the partnership agreement or analogous document was
negotiated and executed.
4. Investment in the Firm and Ownership of Firm Assets
Generally, firm assets may be included in a compensation
package, or title to them may be otherwise transferred completely
independent of an employment relationship. Employees commonly
90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
92. See Bret L. Grebe, Fidelity at the Workplace: The Two-Faced Nature of the Duty of
Loyalty Under Dalton v. Camp, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1815,1819 (2002) ("{Tihe employment-agency
relationship gives rise to some fiduciary duty of loyalty, the breadth and scope of which
depends on the nature of the employment relationship.").
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own stock in the company for which they work-this does not make
them partners, nor does it demonstrate a per se ability to protect
their employment interests." Ownership of firm assets, therefore,
is not necessarily indicative of status. Although an individual
owning a significant block of firm assets more justifiably could be
regarded as having sufficient power to protect those interests, such
an individual rarely will fail to satisfy the prima facie exemption
threshold as it would be determined by alternative factors
suggested below. In short, there are factors at the courts' disposal
that are more dispositive on this issue than investment and
ownership.94
5. The Right and Duty to Act as an Agent of Other Partners
Agency should be an important factor in determining status,
notably because the partnership exemption itself rests upon the
foundation of agency liability.95 Acts of one partner can be imparted
to the others, exposing all partners to substantial risk. Accordingly
courts have made the right to act as an agent of the partnership an
important element of the analysis. The Sixth Circuit found it very
telling that, in Simpson v. Ernst & Young, "[Simpson] had no
authority to sign promissory notes on behalf of the firm, or pledge,
transfer, or otherwise assign his interest in the firm.n
96
Vicarious liability, however, operates to bind the partnership in
the same manner as agency liability. An employee acting within the
scope of his or her employment can expose the employer in the same
way one partner can expose the other partners, yet that employee
is no closer to partnership status. Furthermore, modern partner-
ship statutes provide for the inadvertent creation of partnerships
97
93. Only inside investors are included in this inquiry, as outside investors are by
definition neither employees nor partners.
94. See infra Part III.B. Note that corporate employees who are also shareholders present
a problem beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 10.
95. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
96. 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996).
97. See UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 202 cmt. 1 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 93 (2001) (noting that co-owners
of a business for profit "may inadvertently create a partnership despite their expressed
subjective intention not to do so").
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and the creation of partnerships by estoppel for liability purposes.98
Though probative, the ability of an agent to expose the partnership
to liability is not dispositive of status, nor does it conclusively show
an individual's ultimate power of control within a business entity.
It is also worth noting that in limited liability firms, personal
liability is a less salient issue. As a result, the agency-liability
underpinnings of the partnership exemption weaken, and an
individual's ability to subject his or her associates to liability loses
much significance. In limited liability settings, the right and
duty to act as an agent of other partners should be afforded no
substantial weight.
6. Use of the Term "Co-Owners"
Co-owners of a business for profit can be deemed de facto
partners even if contrary to their intent.99 Similarly, there is no
requirement that the term be used only where the reality of the
situation is less than equal ownership and participation. The
economic realities test replaced the per se rule because courts and
the legislature preferred a test based on reality to a test based on
identity. Use of the term "co-owners," therefore, should not be
afforded much weight in the determination of employment status
and eligibility for benefits under Title VII, the ADEA, or ERISA.
7. Extent of the Individual's Employment Security
The fact that an employment relationship cannot be character-
ized as employment-at-will speaks volumes about an individual's
ability to protect his or her interest within a business entity.' 0
98. See UNIF. P'SHiPACT § 308 (1997), 6 U.L.A 128 (2001) (imposing partnership liability
on a person who has been held out as a partner and who has consented to that
representation).
99. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 92 (2001) ("[Tihe association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or
not the persons intend to form a partnership.").
100. "The employment at-will doctrine permits employers to terminate employees at any
time and for any reason, or more importantly, for no reason at all ...." James E. Defranco,
Modification of the Employee at-will Doctrine-Balancing Judicial Development of the
Common Law with the Legislative Prerogative to Declare Public Policy, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J.
65, 65 (1985). Where the employment is not at-will, the employee cannot be terminated in
20031 1477
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Employment security, however, is not dispositive of partnership
status. It is possible for an employee to have a twenty-year or even
a lifetime employment contract and still lack the traditional indicia
of partnership status.
Employment security may also be impossible to measure.
Admittedly, many of the factors discussed in this Note are difficult
to gauge or are volatile (another reason to keep the number of
factors involved at a minimum), but employment security is even
more complex and shifting than most. First of all, job security must
take into account more than just an employee's work. Relationships
with superiors and clients, ability to bring new work to the firm,
name recognition, and type of work must all be considered. The
weight given each is likely to change significantly depending on the
company, and a change in company management, the economy, or
client list could affect job security overnight. In short, this is merely
another factor that helps courts identify true partners, but could be
replaced by other factors more indicative of actual status.
8. Voting Rights
Voting rights seem to be a fairly good indicator of an individual's
ability to protect his or her own interests. Furthermore, voting
rights are part of a traditional bundle of rights associated with
equity partners. 1 The right to vote on business decisions may not
protect an individual's interest as clearly as it may first appear.
A right to vote does not necessarily correlate with a right to be
heard. Voting rights may become merely nominal if others, whether
possessing greater or lesser voting rights, wield a greater share of
influence. In other words, company dynamics other than the best
judgement of the majority of those eligible to cast their ballots may
contribute to the outcome of a vote. Tactics that may weaken voting
rights include the use of weighted votes or the requirement of
supermajority approval.0 2 Under these circumstances, those
the absence of just cause. Id. at 67.
101. See Dennis B. Arnold, Creditors'Rights and Partnership Debtors: Selected Issues in
Structuring Partnership Debt and an Approach to Workouts, 19 ANN. INST. ON REAL EST. L.
351 (1990).
102. See Jonathan Shub, Comment, Shareholder Rights Plans-Do They Render
Shareholders Defenseless Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL J. CORP. L. 991, 1004
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occupying the actual seats of power-the majority--obtain a
stranglehold on the controls and voting rights may become illusory.
B. Some Suggested Factors
1. Ability to Determine the Salaries of Others
This factor works well to single out those possessing true power
within a business entity with one qualification; the salaries an
individual is empowered to set must be those of employees with
substantial value to the firm. An individual may determine what
his or her secretary gets paid, but this right does not necessarily
correlate with the power or ability to protect one's own interests. An
ability to set the salaries of a block of employees or of crucial
employees is more indicative of an individual's status.
This factor combines the elements of several other factors.
Establishing compensation levels on behalf of the firm indicates a
right and duty to act as an agent of the firm (the established
compensation level will bind the firm) as well as a right and duty
to participate in management. Furthermore, it provides less
incentive for manipulation than some of the other factors used by
courts. Firms would be less likely to grant this right to their
employees in an effort to falsely designate them as partners because
of the importance of the duty. Unlike a grant of voting rights, for
example, this power cannot be made illusory by other
arrangements.
2. Ability to Make Decisions Outside of One's Own Ambit
An individual with influence across the spectrum of a business is
empowered beyond one who merely carries influence within his or
her own ambit. Influence beyond one's own ambit could be defined
as cross-departmental control. A marketing executive's ability to
influence decisions made in other departments, such as information
technology, human resources, or research and development, is
exercising influence beyond his or her own ambit. One who oversees
(1987) (discussing the use of"phased" voting rights, superior voting rights, and supermajority
voting plans to defend against takeovers by diluting an acquirer's voting power).
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multiple departments will almost certainly satisfy this test. In a
partnership, the partners equally share the broad powers of the
business. Identifying an individual's ability to make decisions
normally lying beyond the range of that individual's immediate
sphere of influence thus seeks to identify relationships replicating
the form of a true partnership.
This inquiry is not limited by business form. A court trying to
determine whether it is inequitable to deny protection to an
individual based on an assessment of true partnership power can
determine the scope of an individual's influence regardless of the
nature of the entity involved. Cross-departmental control is possible
in a limited liability partnership (LLP), limited liability company
(LLC), professional corporation (PC), or any other modern business
form.
Unlike other factors currently in use, the answer can be given
either in the affirmative or the negative. There is no gradient or
balancing test involved. Take, for example, investment in the firm.
How much is enough? Thresholds will vary by circuit, by court, and
by state, producing the sort of inconsistent decisions that mar the
application of the economic realities test. As a result, using an
individual's scope of decision-making ability to determine status
will decrease litigation relative to other gradient-oriented
approaches, thereby conserving judicial resources. Not only will the
inquiry be shorter and more simplified for courts, but employers
will be able to more accurately predict which employees should be
eligible for benefits and which employees can be justifiably
exempted.
Finally, this factor is nearly devoid of an incentive to manipulate.
Firms will be unlikely to grant this right to their employees in an
effort to falsely designate them as partners for two primary
reasons. First, the concession does not justify the gain. Allowing an
employee to influence the course of the business, not only in his or
her own realm but in others' as well, is too much power to grant an
employee simply to remove them from the reach of employment
discrimination legislation.
Second, the number of individuals within a firm empowered to
make decisions is naturally limited. If everyone were permitted a
say in firm-wide decisions, it would be analogous to the case of
voting rights, which may offer illusory power, and a court would not
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be satisfied that an exemption is valid. If only certain individuals
are empowered to make such decisions, however, the number of
employees will outweigh the number of decisions to be made and
the category of individuals possessing that broad discretionary
power must be limited.
In short, a large firm cannot designate too many of its employees
as true partners by assigning them all broad decision-making
ability because the result would be chaotic and, once again, the
concession would not justify the gain. A smaller firm, however,
could designate a large number of its employees as true partners.
In such a case, assuming voting power is real, it may be proper to
conclude that all members are subject to exemption.
C. A Shortened List of Factors
For the reasons stated above, the most telling factor, as well as
the simplest to apply, is an individual's right to make decisions
beyond his or her own ambit. Another factor courts may use to
supplement a simplified economic realities test is an individual's
right to determine the compensation levels of crucial employees.
Although both of these factors are relevant, a strong showing of one
should be enough to subject an employee to exemption. It is difficult
to imagine a situation in which an individual will possess these
rights and not possess many or all of the myriad factors
traditionally used in the economic realities test. For example,
individuals who qualify for an exemption under the two suggested
factors will also most likely possess a substantial degree of
employment security, a right to vote on key issues, a right and duty
to participate in firm profits and losses, and a right to act as an
agent of other partners. The proposed factors identify individuals
with a right to control and operate the business and to participate
in management, only in a more concrete fashion. In other words,
the inquiry is more likely to be answered objectively by applying
these tests than by requiring a judge to make a subjective
determination whether the power to control and manage is
sufficient to justify exemption.
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D. Application of the Exemption Test
Limited liability companies present a difficult case for several
reasons. First, they are relatively new, so there is little case law to
guide an inquiry."0 3 Professor Kleinberger also points out two
additional complexities:
[T]he hybrid nature of an LLC (part partnership and part
corporation), and the resulting difficulty in extrapolating from
cases dealing with analogous issues in the context of
partnerships and corporations; and ... the dichotomous nature
of any LLC member who actively works for an LLC-one part
capitalist owner, one part laboring service provider. The [latter]
source is especially problematic because the available case law
has had difficulty handling that dichotomy in the context of
well-established entities-i.e., partnerships and corporations. "4
The nature of the entity, consisting of both corporate and
partnership elements, as well as the nature of the member, who is
at once an owner and an employee, generally make LLCs a hotbed
of employment law questions.
Most LLC statutes grant the organizers freedom to set the
management powers vested in each member. 105 Management can be
centralized, as in a corporation, or all members can retain
management rights, which essentially means that control is
dispersed equally among members as in a partnership.'" LLCs can
be member managed or non-member managed, though members
103. See Susan Kalinka, Assignment of an Interest in a Limited Liability Company and
the Assignment of Income, 64 U. CIN. L. REV 443, 443 (1996) ("It is difficult to describe the
characteristics of an LLC with perfect accuracy because a Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act has not been widely adopted ....") (footnote omitted); Kleinberger, supra note
4, at 481.
104. Kleinberger, supra note 4, at 481.
105. See, e.g., Missouri Limited Liability Company Act §§ 359.745-.746, MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 347.079-.081 (West 2001). The Missouri approach is based on the American Bar
Association Draft Prototype LLC Act. Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability
Company: Evidence of a Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1193, 1206(1995).
106. See Nimrod T. Chapel, Jr., The Limited Liability Company: Small Business
Applications in Missouri, 53 J. MO. B. 348 (1997), available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/
1997/novdec/chapel.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
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commonly reserve management powers for themselves. 107 There are,
therefore, an infinite number of gradations with regards to the
power each individual member of the LLC may possess; a case-by-
case inquiry using scores of factors is simply inefficient and
impractical.
Choice of management structure is contemporaneous with
formation. Centralized management in an LLC functions much like
a corporate board of directors.' 8 If centralized management is
chosen, all those occupying the seats of power would by definition
possess the ability to make cross-departmental decisions. Members
not on the central managerial board would not be expected to
participate in firm-wide management. Any member with a right to
make firm-wide decisions falling beyond the scope of his or her area
of specialization, therefore, would occupy a position of influence
sufficient to show a lack of dependence on the employer and limited
vulnerability to employment discrimination.
The company could exempt the member managers from federal
protection and the burden would then shift to the plaintiff-member
to rebut the prima facie showing of influence beyond the member's
ambit and/or ability to set the salaries of others. If this is not done,
the member will forfeit standing. Post hoc suits would be allowed
to proceed only on the limited grounds that assurances of
management participation and salary control were illusory-i.e.,
never materialized or influence was greatly diluted by factors
unknown to the employee at the time of the execution (such as a
weighted voting system, etc.). Any member not represented on the
management board would probably be nonexempt, as he or she,
would likely possess none of the attributes used to demonstrate lack
of dependency under the exemption test this Note proposes.
Where an LLC opts out of centralized management, no well
defined group of individuals within the company occupies the seat
of power.0 9 If decisions are truly made by all members, then all
107. See id.
108. Id. at 352 n.102 ("An LLC that provides for centralized management is similar to a
corporation electing a board of directors."); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (as amended
in 1993).
109. If, in the alternative, the LLC elects centralized management, a well-defined group
of individuals will occupy the seat of power. Centrally managed (also called member-
managed) LLCs are governed by a body analogous to a corporate board of directors. See, e.g.,
Kalinka, supra note 103, at 453 ("The managers, who are chosen by the members, can be
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members would possess the powers sufficient to subject their offices
to exemption."' If, on the other hand, certain members have the
final say in firm-wide decisions, then the facade of independence
may give way to the justification for federal protections on behalf of
the less privileged members. If, for example, senior members were
given the final say on firm-wide policy issues, then newer members
would become exemption-proof even in the absence of centralized
management. The burden in a suit would then shift back to the
company to rebut the prima facie showing of dependency by
showing that the member does possess legitimate influence in
decision making outside the scope of his or her ambit and/or can set
the salaries of crucial employees. If the company fails to exercise
this option prior to the execution of the employment agreement, it
must later overcome a presumption in favor of the employee by
showing that, regardless of the original intent, such employee did
enjoy those powers.
The exemption test allows companies to retain freedom of choice
in two ways. First, it allows a company to determine in its
formative stages the permissible scope of autonomy from federal
regulations. If a firm wishes to retain carte blanche with regard to
employment decisions, then it need only extend to those members
employed solely at the employer's discretion sufficient powers with
which to protect their own interests. Otherwise, the company is on
notice that federal regulations apply. Employees will no longer be
deprived of both power and the protection of federal discrimination
laws. Instead, employees will knowingly forfeit federal protections
in exchange for greater power.
Second, a firm may wish to extend federal employment
discrimination protection to employees even if the employees are
nonexempt. Though at first glance it may appear that management
would cripple its own interests by opening the door to increased
litigation, competition for skilled employees in the workforce may
drive employers to offer greater job security to gain a competitive
edge in recruitment. Because workplace discrimination should be
compared to the directors of a corporation whom the shareholders elect to manage the
corporation's business and affairs.") (citations omitted).
110. Note that, as described above, all members may have a vote but, in a large LLC, the
weight of that vote may be so diluted that it would be a stretch to say that the employee is
making decisions. In these cases, nobody, not everybody, would be subject to exemption.
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discouraged in the first place, any system wherein employers were
precluded from providing additional protection to their employees
despite a desire to do so would be counterproductive. Employers,
therefore, should retain a right to construe all of their employees as
nonexempt, and to draft employment contracts offering additional
job security at their discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the purpose of determining eligibility for protection under
employment discrimination legislation, courts must determine who
qualifies as an employee and who is more accurately characterized
as a partner or employer. Courts have in the past used two different
measures to make this determination, the per se rule and the
economic realities test.
The per se rule is generally a formalistic approach in which a
business entity's choice of organizational form is dispositive. Courts
utilizing the per se rule universally offer protection to plaintiffs
litigating against entities in corporate form. Partners of a business
in partnership form, on the other hand, are exempted from
protection on the grounds that they are employers rather than
employees. Labels are conclusive proof of ineligibility, though some
courts may look further to determine if partnership status is
equitable or merely nominal.
The economic realities test rejects the formalistic per se rule in
favor of a more flexible standard offering protection to both nominal
partners and employees who do not share the traditional rights and
duties of partners. In other words, where reality does not evidence
an individual's ability to protect his or her own interests, the
economic realities test recognizes that exemption from federal
protections is unwarranted. Traditional economic realities tests use
many factors and an extensive inquiry to determine whether fancy
job titles reflect one's actual ability to defend oneself against
adverse employment actions.
The per se rule offers predictability for both employers and
employees, and thus conserves judicial resources. It also provides
firms with the ability to self-regulate and respects their freedom to
choose their own associates and opt out of exposure to certain types
of liability through choosing partnership over corporate form. The
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economic realities test effectuates congressional intent by extending
protection to those who need it, regardless of status. It also
prevents firms from easily circumventing federal legislation
through false designation and may reduce dependency on
government assistance.
Modern business forms blur the line between partnership and
incorporation, and modern partnership agreements resemble
contracts of adhesion rather than arms-length bargaining
arrangements. Thus, a formalistic approach is no longer justified,
though any new test should not ultimately disregard the strengths
of the per se rule, including predictability and economy.
Of all the economic realities test factors that a court might
consider, the right and duty to make decisions outside an
individual's own ambit and the right and duty to set the
compensation levels of others are the most indicative of status
sufficient to justify exemption from federal employment
discrimination laws. Not only do these factors encompass more
specific inquiries (i.e., investment in the firm), they also are the
most indicative of more general inquiries vis-a-vis other proposed
factors (i.e., ability to control and operate the business and the right
and duty to participate in management).
Under the exemption test proposed in this Note, an employer
could exempt individuals holding predetermined offices from
protection, subject to a rebuttable threshold showing of true partner
status. In the event of an ex ante challenge to exemption status,
sufficient power to qualify an individual for exemption at the
discretion of his employer will be determined by a simplified version
of the economic realities test, involving only two factors: an
individual's right and duty to make business decisions beyond his
or her range of specialization, and the right to set the compensation
levels of non-trivial employees.
Post hoc challenges would only be permitted on the grounds that
actual duties differed from those reasonably anticipated by the
moving party, and must still overcome a presumption in favor of the
nonmoving party.
The exemption test would conserve judicial resources and foster
predictability among both employees and employers. It would also
allow firms to opt out of exposure to certain types of liability by
designating certain employees as exempt and, consequently, beyond
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the scope of employment discrimination laws. The exemption test,
however, does not frustrate congressional intent because it does not
refuse protection to those who need it; partners ineligible for
exemption fall within the protections of federal law. It also prevents
firms from easily circumventing the legislation through thus
endowing their employees with bogus titles. The exemption test
combines the desirable elements of both the per se rule and the
economic realities test.
Darren M. Creasy*
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